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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This introduction describes the two main traditions of research that have histori­
cally underlain work on baxgaining: The axiomatic approach and the variable-threat 
approach. This introduction also describes this dissertation, and the approach to 
n-player bargaining that it presents. 
1.2 Axiomatic Approach 
The axiomatic approach to bargaining was first developed by Nash [17] for the 
case of n = 2 players, the case to which it largely remains focused to the present day. 
Nash was interested in predicting an outcome for any given bargaining situation, and 
proposed a set of axioms about the relationship of the predicted outcome to the set 
of feasible outcomes. 
The axiomatic approach includes formulating axioms on how a problem can be 
solved and checking whether the axioms are compatible (i.e., whether there exist 
solutions satisfying them all). The primary task within this approach is to formulate 
the axioms. 
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1.2.1 Nash solution 
According to Nash, a two-person bargaining problem is a triple (5, where 
S, the feasible set, is a subset of the two-dimensional Euclidean space, and 
a status quo or disagreement or threat point, taken by Nash to be the maximin pair, 
is a point of S. Here, each point of S represents the utility levels, obtained by 
the two players through the choice of some joint action. If both players agree on 
a particular point of S, then that point is what they get; however, if they fail to 
reach an agreement, each player gets dj and respectively. It is assumed that the 
set S is compact cind convex and that there exists a point x = (a:i,Z2) of ^ strictly 
dominating d, which means a:^ > di and X2> d2- Compactness includes closedness 
(contains its boundary) and boundedness (it is contained in some sphere of finite 
radius). 
The assumption that S contains at least one point strictly dominating d is to 
guarantee that both players are non-trivially involved; i.e., both should have some­
thing to gain. 
A bargaining solution {di,d2) will be a function of (Sjd^^^d^): 
{ d i , d 2 )  =  V'(5,4»4)-
The axioms formulated by Nash, for the two-player case, are as follows (where 
the symbol < denotes component-wise inequalities): 
1. Individual Rationality: {di,d2) > {d'^jd^). 
2. Feasibility: {di,d2) € 5. 
3. Pareto-Optimality: If (<^1,^2) G S, and (^1,^2) ^ (<^b<^2)> — 
3 
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: If {di,d2) € T C 5, and = 
9(S,dl4), then (rfi.rfj) = 
5. Independence of Linear Transformations: Let T be obtained from S by the 
linear transformation 
/ 
= "1 • 
/ 
^2 = +^2-
T h e n ,  i f  ( ^ ( 5 , 4 , =  { d i , d 2 ) y  
t p { T ,  a 2 - d 2 +  ^ 2 )  = ("1 " + ^ 1' ^ 2 ' ^ 2  + ^ 2 ) -
6. Symmetry: Suppose S is such that 
{ d i , d 2 ) e S  < 1 = ^  { d 2 , d i ) e S .  
Suppose also </| = and = {di^d2)- Then, 
Nash proposed the following solution, which will be denoted by i/: 
Given (5, G R2^ where R2 is two-dimensioncil Euclidean space, 1/(5, is 
the maximizer of the product (arj^ — ci|) • (x2 — d^) over the points a: of 5 dominating 
According to Thomson and Lensberg, Nash's domain and his solution can 
directly be extended to the n-player case. The n-player solution cissociates with every 
{S,d*), d* 6 Rn the unique maximizer of the product n(sj — d*) over the points x 
of S dominating d*. 
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The Nash solution for the two-player case, with each d* = 0, is presented in 
Figure 1.1. 





player I (*;) 
Figure 1.1: The Nash solution 
1.2.2 Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 
According to Thomson and Lensberg, a new impetus to the axiomatic theory of 
bargaining was given by Kalai and Smorodinsky [13]. 
• The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K is defined by setting, for all S G R2, K{S) 
to be the maximal point of S on the segment connecting the origin to a(5), the 
ideal point of S, defined by aj-(S') = max{a;j- | a; € 5} for each i. 
This solution has been studied primarily for the two-player case, as shown in 
Figure 1.2. A distinguishing feature between the Nash solution and the Kalai-
5 
Smorodinsky solution is that the latter responds more satisfactorily to expansions 
and contractions of the feasible set. In addition to the axioms listed in the previ­
ous section, except that of independence of irrelevant alternatives, it satisfies the 
following axiom. 
• Individual monotonicity: Consider S and S in R2, with S C S such that 
02(5) = 02(8 ) (respectively, 01(5) = 01(5 )). Then (^1(5) < ) (respec­
tively, (P2i^) ^ V2('^'))-
player n 
player I 
Figure 1.2: The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 
1.2.3 Egalitarian solution 
A third solution, namely the Egalitarian solution, has cis its main feature distin­
guishing it from the previous two solutions the feature that it involves interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. This solution was suggested by Kalai, and is illustrated in 
Figure 1.3. 
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• The Egalitarian solution E is defined by setting, for all S G R2-, -^(5) to be 
the maximal point of S of equal coordinates. 
The distinguishing feature of this solution is that it satisfies the following mono-
tonicity condition, which involves no restrictions on the expansions that take S into 
s'. 
• Strong monotonicity: For all S,S E i?2j S  C  S  ,  then < y(5 ). 
1.2.4 Utilitarian solution 
A fourth solution, namely the Utilitarian solution characterized by Myerson [16], 




Figure 1.3: The Egalitarian solution 
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The Utilitarian solution, illustrated in Figure 1.4, is achieved by maximizing 
the sum of utilities over the feasible set. In the two-person case, when there exist 
more than one point maximizing the sum of utilities, selecting the midpoint of the 
maximizers may be a natural choice. However, for the case of n > 2, there is no 
equally natural choice. Also,the Utilitarian solution does not satisfy the axiom of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
player n ) 
U(S) 
player I(*,) 
Figure 1.4: The Utilitarian solution 
1.2.5 Peters' solution 
Peters [21] is concerned almost entirely with the case of two players. He consid­
ered two other approaches to bargaining: namely, multisolution (multivalued bargain­
ing solution) and probabilistic solution. The multisolution assigns a set of outcomes, 
not one outcome, to a bargaining game, and are considered with an independence 
of irrelevant alternatives property and with restricted monotonicity property. The 
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probabilistic solution assigns a probability measure, instead of one fixed outcome, to 
the subsets of outcomes of a bargaining game. The multisolution concept is taken 
up in this dissertation to treat the case of n players, albeit in a sense different from 
Peters'. 
1.3 Variable-Threat Approach 
The variable-threat approach also was pioneered by Nash [18]. Nash extended 
his previous work on The Bargaining Problem [17] to a situation in which threats 
can play a role, the so-called variable-threat approach. In this section, we will briefly 
describe Nash's version of the variable-threat approach, followed by our description of 
Owen's [20] additional contributions, followed in turn by our description of Harsanyi's 
[10] further enhancement of the theory. 
1.3.1 Nash's approach 
Nash was interested in situations involving two players whose interests are neither 
completely coincident nor completely opposed. 
1.3.1.1 Fixed-threat approach The fixed threat approach is relatively 
simple, and does not require an underlying bi-matrix normal form. This approach, 
illustrated in Figure 1.5, deals with a compact "prospect space" B that need not be 
convex, but is usually taken to be such, and a given "threat pair" (^1,^2)-
context, Nash suggests a certain behavioral considerations that leads to a bargaining 
payoff vector u = (uj,u2) G 5 by a "hyperbolic construction". That construction 
identifies u as that point in the boundary of B that maximizing the function (uj — 
9 
player n (;i^) 
player I (*/) 
Figure 1.5: Nash solution with fixed threats 
^l) ("2 ~ ^2)' subject to 
1.3.1.2 Variable-threat approach Unlike the fixed threat approach, this 
approach requires an underlying bi-matrix normal form, and is now illustrated for 
the 2x2 case. To begin with, one constructs B as the convex hull {CH) of the four 
points 
C H :  { { x , y ) \ { x , y )  =  ^ 2 , u )  +  ^ 1 2  '  ^ ^ 1 , 1 2 ,  ^ 2 , 1 2 )  
+ (^1,21'-'^2,21) + ^22 • U^l,22'-'^2,22)} 
where the four constitute an arbitrary set of four convex weights, and where 
Ki^lm denotes the element in /th row and mth column of the 2x2 payoff matrix for 
player i. The rationale for CH is that we are modeling a cooperative game, where 
mixtures are chosen jointly. 
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The possible threat pairs (^1,^2) imagined to be those points of CH that 
can be generated by independent mixing. The set of such possible threat pairs is here 
denoted by C: 
C: {((1,(2)1 ( i i , i2)  = (( i(«l ,  (2(^1 
+ 4 • • (^1,21' '^2,21) + 4 • ^2 • ('^1,22" '^2,22)} 
where {6^,0^) are called a threat strategy pair. 
C typically is strictly contained in B, and may not be convex. Of course, 
1 9  for every possible threat strategy pair { 6 ^ , 6  ) in C  we can develop a payoff pair 
0^), U2{O^,0^)), by applying the fixed threat hyperbolic solution to the threat 
pair 
We now treat the parameterized pair {ui {0^, 0^), U2{0^, 0^)) as a bi-kernel game. 
Nash argues that bi-kernel game is "almost" like an ordinary extension of a matrix 
game, in that all of its equilibrium points are "maximin" points of equal payoff. 
1.3.2 Owen's approach 
Consider then the bi-kernel game According to Owen 
[20], computing optima,l threat strategies generally is complicated since the arbitra­
tion value corresponding to a pair of threat strategies depends not only on 
and t2{0^•,0'^)i but also on the form of the Pareto-optimal (northeastern) boundary 
of the set B. Owen argued that since all that is required of B is that it be convex, 
there is, in general, no obvious method of solution. 
However, Owen pointed out that, the problem becomes simple if the northeastern 
11 
boundary of CH is linear; i.e., has equation 
H { x , y )  =  a i - x  +  a 2 - y - k  =  0 ,  (1.1) 
as shown in Figure 1.6. 
If we let (tX]^,U2) be the solution point, the slope of the line segment connecting 
and (ui,«2) should be the negative of the slope of the relation (1.1), hence 
y - h  ^ £1 
X — 
which can be rewritten as 
ai • (a: - f^) = 02 • (j/ - t^). (1.2) 
Then, we are able to find (u2,u2) from the relations (1.1) and (1.2), yielding 
player II (y ) 
player I(x) 
Figure 1.6: Variable-threat solution by Owen's approach 
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^ 1  -  ^ ' ^ 2  +  ^  
«1 = ^2 
and 
U2 = . 
So, in effect, player I's payoffs, as functions of the players' threat strategies, in 
effect are given by 
= «} • 9? • 
"1 




+ 9^ • • (A:i 22 - ? • A'2,22). (1-3) 
"1 
and player II's payoffs are in effect given by the negative of (1.3), multiplied by aifa2-
Hence, the optimal threat strategies simply are derivable by treating (1.3) as an 
ordinary extension of the matrix game with matrix 
0,0 
^1,/m - for l,m = 1,2. 
1 
1.3.3 Harsanyi's approach 
We have seen so far that Ncish invented the idea that the variable-threat game 
is "almost" a probabilistic extension of a zero-sum game, and that Owen showed 
that, with a linear northeast boundary of CH, the variable-threat game is solvable as 
the probabilistic extension of a zero-sum game. Harsanyi's contribution is that the 
13 
variable-threat game in the case of a general convex compact CH can be iteratively 
solved, essentially, by solving a sequence of extended zero-sum games. So let the 
northeast boundary of Ci? be given by 
H { x , y )  =  0, 
and let Hi and H2 be the first derivatives of the function H with respect to x and y, 
respectively. Harsanyi proposed a solution that is implementable recursively in the 
following way, beginning with a candidate optimal payoff pair (u]^,u2): 
1. Pick a point (ui,u2) on the northeast boundary. 
2. Compute (c]^, 02), where 
3. Solve the zero-sum game with kernel obtaining (^oi^o)-
4. Compute J^o) <2(^o>^o)' 
5. Check whether 
- a2-{u2-t2{0l,Ol)) = 0. (1.4) 
6. If (1.4) holds, then itj and U2 constitute the solution. If not, try another point 
(ui,it2), in keeping with the sign of the left hand side of (1.4). 
Harsanyi also developed a complex model for the n-player cooperative game 
based on the two-player case, reducing the n-player cooperative game to combinations 
of two-player subgames between coalitions. 
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1.4 About This Dissertation 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows: 
In Chapter 2, ordinary stable sets for n-person cooperative games will be de­
scribed. 
Chapter 3 deals with my view of an n-player bargaining with and without coali­
tions, based on the concept of preference intensity. 
Chapter 4 describes the definition of bargaining-stable sets. 
Chapter 5 explores examples of bargaining-stable sets for various cases. 
Chapter 6 compares my bargaining-stable sets with von Neumann - Morgenstern 
stable sets, the Shapley value and the Shapley - Harsanyi value. 
Chapter 7 discusses certain aspects of external bargaining-stability. 
Chapter 8 presents conclusions. 
As indicated in this introduction, there is little consensus on whether and how 
bargaining theory is naturally extendable to the case of n players. In sum, this 
dissertation proposes one further approach to n-player bargaining, combining the 
classical idea of a stable set with the idea of preference intensity, and verifies its 
implementability. 
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CHAPTER 2. SPECIFIC BACKGROUND 
2.1 Stable Sets for n-person Cooperative Games 
An important solution concept for n-player cooperative games involves a set of 
payoff vectors x = (xi,a;2, •" • j®n) that might possibly result as a consequence of 
playing the game. Suggested "solutions" to the game are small subsets of such a set, 
or even particular compelling members of the set. 
The classical concept for the set of possible payoff vectors is von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's concept of a set of imputations, and among their cleissical solution ideas 
is the notion of a stable set. Both concepts assume the possibilities of side-payments 
among coalition members, so that it is meaningful to talk about coalition guarantees 
- indeed, about cumulative (i.e., summed over coalition members) coalition payoffs. 
According to von Neumaan and Morgenstern's definition, an imputation, for an 
n-person cooperative game, is a vector x = X2? •'" > ^n)i where is the amount 
imputed to player i. The imputations will satisfy the following two conditions; 
Firstly, no player will agree to receive less than he can obtain individually by 
playing independently of the other players. Hence, it is required that 
X j  >  v { i )  for all i  G  N ,  
where u(i) is the amount that player i can guarantee for him/herself, and where N 
16 
denotes the set of all players. 
Secondly, it is required that 
i e N  
where v { N )  is the cumulative payoff (summed over all players) that the coalition of 
all players can guarantee for itself. 
Let X and y be two imputations in a game, and suppose that the players are 
faced with a choice between x and y. Then it is interesting to find a criterion for 
comparing a: to y. Unless x = j/, it is clear that some players will prefer x to y while 
others prefer y to x. An important consideration, then, is the question whether the 
players prefering x to y are strong enough, as a coalition, to enforce the choice of x. 
If we let X and y be two imputations and C be a coalition, then it is said that x 




XI > yi for all z G C (2.2) 
where v { C )  is the total amount that the members of C  can guarantee for themselves, 
whatever the remaining players may do. 
Condition (2.1), called the effectiveness condition, expresses the fact that the 
coalition C is truly capable of obtaining what the imputation x gives it collectively. 
And condition (2.2), called preferability condition, expresses the fact that all members 
of coalition C prefer x to y. Finally, x is said to dominate y if a; dominates y through 
some C. 
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With the definitions mentioned above, a set T of imputations is defined to be 
stable if 
1. For x , y  G T ,  X does not dominate y .  
The first condition says that no imputation in a stable set T dominates another 
imputation in T; this is known as internal stability. The second condition says that 
any imputation which is not in the stable set T is dominated by some imputation in 
T] this is known as external stability. 
The following example, taken from Owen [20], shows two specific kinds of stable 
sets for a three player game. 
(Example) Considering the constant-sum three person game in (0,1) normalization, 
fo r  wh ich  the  imputa t ions  fo rm the  s implex  +  X2 +  ^  Oj  w i th  u ( l ) ,  
v(2), u(3) all equal to zero, and t;({l,2}), v({l,3}), i;({2,3}) and u({l,2,3}) all equal 
to one. Then, the set 
2. For any x not in T, there is a y 6 T such that y dominates x. 
(2.3) 
and the sets 
^1 ifc ~ ®2' 1 ~ ^ ~ ®2) I 0 ^ ®2 — 1"" A: 6 [ 0, ;^ ), and 
^2,Jfc = {(1 - ^ - ®3' ®3) I 0 < ®3 ^ 1 A: 6 [ 0, ^ ), and 
^3,ib = {{xi, l-k-xi,k)\0 <xi<l-k}, for 6 [ 0, ^ ), 




Figure 2.1: A stable set T for the three-person constant-sum game 
,x, = k 
Figure 2.2: A stable set for the three-person constant-sum game 
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2.2 Two-player Preference Intensity 
2.2.1 Preference intensity 
The concept of the two-player preference intensity was first introduced by Zeu-
then [28]. Zeuthen's approach is bcised on a direct analysis of the process of collective 
bargaining on the labor market. However, his approach has general validity for any 
kind of bargaining situation. Akbar [1] introduced an algebraic version of preference 
intensity that is the basis of the ra-player formulation in this dissertation. 
2.2.2 Zeuthen's approach 
Zeuthen's concept, which essentially was formulated using zero threat values, 
may be discussed as follows: 
If both players bargain for the best terms, they may be expected to have their 
own favorable terms that could be accepted or rejected by their opponents. 
Suppose player I would like to gain but has been offered the less favorable 
terms A2 by player II. The question here is: should he/she insist on obtaining Ai or 
should he/she accept A2? Let and Ui{A2) be the net utility gains over the 
conflict situation that player I would derive from the terms and A2, respectively. 
Then we see, by assumption, that > Ui{A2)- And let P2 be the probabiHty 
that player II would reject the term Then, if player I accepts A2, he will obtain 
Ui{A2), while if he rejects A2 and insists on the better terms Aj he will have the 
probability (1 — P2) of obtaining the higher utility £/j(A]^) and the probability P2 of 
obtaining nothing. 
By assumption, player I tries to maximize his expected utility; hence, he will 
20 
accept the term A2 if 
U I { A 2 )  >  { l  - P 2 ) ' U i i A i y ,  
that is, if 
or, simply 
U M l )  -  C^l(>'2) . ^ 
AUi 
ITf < ^2 
and will reject A2 and insist on the better terms Aj in the opposite case. The utility 
quotient A.U\IU\ represents the maximum risk that player I is prepared to face in 
order to secure the better terms Ai instead of the less favorable term ^2-
Meanwhile, player II is faced with the analogous situation, and will accept the 
terms Aj if 
that is, if 
or, simply 
U 2 i A i )  >  { X - P I ) - U 2 { A 2 ) ' ,  




Thus the two utility quotients, AUi/Ui axid AU2IU2, decide the strength of 
each players' determination to insist on their respective favorable terms. 
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Zeuthen introduced the further assumption that player I will always make a 
concession to player II if 
^ (2.4) 
Ui U2 
Meanwhile, player II will make a concession in the opposite case. 
In effect, inequality (2.4) can also be written in the form; 
C/i(>li) • WaMi) < £/i(A2)-1/2(42) 
Thus, the two players will arrive at terms maximizing the value of Ui • U2, which 
is exactly Nash's solution. 
2.2.3 Akbar's approach 
As shown above, most approaches (J.R. Hicks [11], F. Zeuthen [28], John C. 
Harsanyi [7], John Nash [17]) to the two-player bargaining problem point to the 
following "hyperbolic" solution: Of two possible payoff pairs Ai and A2, with Ui{Aj) 
for player I, and U2{Ai) for player II, that pair will obtain, following bargaining, for 
which the product {Ui{Aj) — vi){U2{Aj) — V2) is the larger. In other words, Ai 
will obtain whenever 
(C/l(/ll) - n)(£'2(Al) - »2) > { V i { A 2 )  -  v i ) ( , U 2 { A 2 )  -  V 2 ) -  (2-5) 
Here uj is a "guarantee" or "threat" for player I, and similarly, V2 for player II. 
While the above references do include other behavioral justifications of this hyperbolic 
solution, Akbar [1] pointed out that it is a consequence of the proposition that that 
player will prevail in the bargaining who sees Ai and A2 as more disparate from his 
22 
own perspective. That is, for example, if 
U I { A 2 )  -  V I  U 2 { A I )  -  V 2  
then player I (reacting to the Ui{Ai)) wil l  wish for the outcome Ai, and player II 
(reacting to the U2{Aj^)) will wish for the outcome A2, with player I's preference 
for Ai over A2 stronger than player IPs preference for A2 over Aj, so that Ai will 
obtain. 
Akbar's behavioral interpretation of circumstances under which Ai will obtain 
generally has the algebraic translation 
max 
> max (2.6) 
which is indeed equivalent to (2.5). 
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CHAPTER 3. MY VIEW OF n-PLAYER BARGAINING 
3.1 Two-player Bargaining 
Adopting a notation natural for later extension to the n-player case, suppose 
that two offers {Ui,U2) and are on the table, where Ui and U2 are the 
terms offered to player I and player II, respectively, under the first offer, and Vi and 
V2 are the terms offered to player I and player II, respectively, under the second offer. 
In player I's point of view, assuming the threats equal zero, player I will consider 
^ or and we can say, player I will like U better thcin V if ^ > 1. Similarly, 
in player IPs point of view, we can say, player II will like U better than V if -^^2. > 1, 
Due to the difference in preference between player I and II, there exists four different 
possibilities we can encounter as follows: 
i) ^ > 1 and ^ > 1 
ii) ^ > 1 and ^ < 1 
»i) ^ < 1 and ^ > 1 
iv) ^ < 1 and ^ < 1 
In case i) and case iv) above, since both players prefer same offer in each case, it 
is quite natural that payoff U and V, respectively, to be the outcome for each case. 
However, in case ii) and case iii), we can not determine the outcome so quickly as 
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we did in case i) and case iv) since each player prefers different offer. For instance, 
in case ii), where player I prefers U while player II prefers V, we say, U will be the 
outcome if ^ which means player I likes U more than player II likes V. 
In other words, offer U will be the outcome if 
Ui-U2 > Vi-V2 (3-1) 
which is exactly same as Nash's solution. 
Now, suppose a two player bargaining with p number of offers where p > 3 . 
Clearly, by a same token, the outcome will be an offer with pair that maximizes its 
products. As shown in Figure 3.1, the outcome will always be a point that touches 
the hyperbola XY = n , where n is any real number, for largest n. 
Also, we see the transitivity in here, meaning that if an offer U is more likely 
Player U's preference (Y) 
XY = n 
Player I's preference (X) 
Figure 3.1: Two player bargaining with p number of offers {p > 3) 
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than V and an offer V is more likely than W, then we say an offer U is more likely 
than W. Accordingly, if offers U, V, IV,-•• are available, then the offers can be 
ordered like U > V > W . 
Hence, for two players, our bargaining concept is in line with the standard bar­
gaining theory approach. 
3.2 Offer Domination for n-player Bargaining Without Coalitions 
In this section, we extend the two player bargaining concept to the general n-
player bargaining case. 
Suppose there are four players (n = 4) confronting two different offers U and V. 
Then the possible payoff vectors could be written as; 
•  U  :  {  U i ,  U 2 ,  C ^ 3 .  )  
.V { Vi, V2, Vg, ^4 ) 
As one can expect, the question here is what should be the outcome from those 
two offers [/ and V with four different players. One clear case for an offer U to be 
the outcome is 
• No player prefers V to U. 
However, we have already recognized that the players have different preferences 
in general, we need to have a condition to decide the outcome from those two offers. 
Hence, we posit that the offer U is more likely to be the outcome when 
• The strongest preference among players prefering offer U is stronger than the 
strongest preference among players prefering offer V. 
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For instance, from above example, if y'- > 77^ ^ ^ ^ 
X 2 3 ^ 
offer U is more likely to be the outcome if that is, if 
C / l - f /g  >  V l - V ^  
which constitutes a natural extension of the two player bargaining case. Generally, 
for two payoff n-tuples U = {Ui, U2, ••• , Un) and V = ( V\, 1^2' '" > )> 
we posit that U will be more likely to obtain than V if the player with the largest 
stake in the outcome favors U; this amounts to 
max ( t )  ^  
which we denote by 
U y V. (3.3) 
Excepting ties, (2.5), (2.6) or equivalently (3.1), provides a complete ordering of 
payoff pairs in the case of n = 2 players. Not so for relation (3.2) and (3.3) in the case 
of n players. Indeed, when we move forward to p number of offers (p > 3), transitivity 
does not hold any more. That is, considering n-player bargaining with 3 offers U, V 
and W, an offer U being more likely than V and an offer V being more likely than W 
does not guarantee an offer U being more likely than W. That discourages us from 
seeking a dominating offer. 
3.3 Offer Domination for n-player Bargaining With Coalitions 
Based on the discussion in section 3.2, we may expand the concept of bargaining 
to include consideration of coalitions. 
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Suppose there are two payoff n-tuples U  =  {  U i ,  U 2 ,  •  •  •  ,  U n  )  and V 
( ^1' • • • ' ^ )> coalition c with cC N. 
Definition 3.3.1 U dominates V, denoted by 













where the maxima are taken over all coalitions, including singletons. 
Definition 3.3.2 The value of the left hand side of (3.4) is called the preference 
intensity for U over V. 







i ^ U i ]  
c > max LCWV A - - f . 
Efi 
(3.5) 
Definition 3.3.4 U strongly dominates V through C if the C of Definition 3.3.3 is 
unique. 
Definition 3.3.5 U and V are equally likely, denoted by 












Note; Suppose a four player bargaining situation with 
U = ( 3/15, 6/15, 2/15, 4/15) and 
V = { 1/15, 2/15, 4/15, 8/15). 
This U and V satisfies the condition given in (3.5) with preference intensity of 3. 
And we say U does not strongly dominate V since the coalition C could be {1}, {2} 
or {1,2}. Hence, we see that a coalition c is not necessarily a singleton. 




i U l  U 2  
\ n' v-s' 
then 
' Vk 
^ > U l  +  U 2  +  • ' •  +  U k  
+ V2 +  • • •  +  Vk 
Proof: The proof of this is quite obvious since 
U 1  +  U 2 +  • • •  + U k  _  U i  n 
V1 +  V2+ • • •  +Vk Vi  1^1+^2+  • • •  +Vk 
+ 
^k Vj, 
V k ' V i + V 2 +  • • •  +Vk 
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so that the left hand side is a weighted average of the UilVi, which clearly is no 
greater than the largest 
i 
Lemma 3.3.2 Strong domination is achieved only by singletons. 
Proof: Suppose that U  strongly dominates V  through the coaHtion { i , j , k } .  Then 
U i  +  U j  +  U u  
— 7^ — > all other ratios. (3.7) 
Vj + Vj + 
However, if for example 
a = „ax I a ^ a 1 
then, by the Lemma 3.3.1, 
 ^ Uj + C/j + [/k 
V .  -  v;-  +  V j  +  V k  '  
which contradicts (3.7). 
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CHAPTER 4. BARGAINING-STABLE SETS 
In similar circumstances, von Neumann and Morgenstern turned to the idea 
of stable sets in the context of "imputations", and Wald [26] to the related idea 
of complete classes in the context of statistical decision rules. While our concern 
here is with "prospect" vectors (this is a terminology due to Harsanyi), rather than 
with imputations, and certainly not with statistical decision rules, we nevertheless 
are motivated, by this prior work, to consider bargaining-stable sets of payoff n-
tuples. Thus, given a collection G of possible "prospect" or payoff n-tuples U = 
( Ui, U2, •' • , Un ),vfe shall consider subsets 5 of G as follows. 
• A subset S is externally bargaining-stable] if, for every V E G\S, there is a 
U S S such that (3.4) holds. 
• A subset S is strongly externally bargaining-stable] if, for every V G G\S, there 
is a C/ E S and a coalition C such that U strongly dominates V through. 
• A subset S is internally bargaining-stable] if, for all pairs {U, V) with U and 
V e 5, (3.6) holds. 
And now, we are able to give the definitions of a bargaining-stable set. 
Definition 4.1 A set S is bargaining-stable if 
i) S is externally bargaining-stable. 
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and 
ii) S is internally bargaining-stable. 
Definition 4.2 A set S is strongly bargaining-stable if 
i) S is strongly externally bargaining-stable, 
and 
ii) S is internally bargaining-stable. 
Lemma 4.1 If a set S is strongly bargaining-stable, then all domination relations 
underlying its external bargaining-stability involve only singletons. 
Proof: By Lemma 3.3.2. 
The examples of bargaining-stable set for various cases will be explored in next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5. EXAMPLES 
In this chapter, we will explore the notion of bargaining-stable set by providing 
some examples for the n-player case, with the prospect space G having form {U : 
n ^ct 
= 1, C/j > 0 }, for Q > 0. We will first treat the case 
i=l ^ 
n > 3, a = 1 and = 1, 
and this will lead easily to the case 
n  >  3 ,  a  =  1  and  >0 .  
Next we treat the case 
n > 3, a > 0 and = 1. 
The case 
n > 3, a > 0 and Cj > 0 
is not explicitly treated, since its treatment follows the treatment of the other cases 
in straight-forward fashion. Also, we will provide an alternative approach for the case 
of three players. 
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5.1 Case of n > 3, a = 1 and = 1 
n 
Consider n-player bargaining, with G the simplex {(7 ; ^ [7j = 1, > 0 }, 
7=1 
containing the subset S = (7^")} consisting of the n payoff n-
tuples. 
n i l )  .  ( L  _J_ _J_ 1 A 
• V  2 '  2 (n - l ) '  2 (n - l ) '  '  2 (n - l )  ;  '  
f/(2) .  ( 1 i  1 1 \ 
•  \  2 (n - l ) '  2 '  2 (n -  l ) '  '  2(n  -  1)  /  '  
u( n) . ( 1 1 1 1 \ 
' \ 2(n - 1)' 2(ra-1)' ' 2(n-l)' 2 J' 
It is not hard to verify that the set S is bargaining-stable. The following lemmas 
are to verify this fact. 
Lemma 5.1.1 S = is internally bargaining-stable. 
Proof: For no i and j, >- since, clearly, 
forall 
Lemma 5.1.2 S = { is externally bargaining-stable. 
Proof: We shall prove Lemma 5.1.2 by means of 3 propositions. 
Proposition 5.1.1 For U with n tied minimum values, i.e., for U = (1 /n ,  •  •  • ,  l / n ) ,  
U ^ ^  y  U  for all i .  
34 
Proof: To begin with, 
(n — 2)^ = — 4n + 4 > 0. 
The above inequality can be rewritten as 
n 2(n — 1) 
2 n 
which is equivalent to 
"  ^  " '=" ' {2 ( ' ' - l ) . - - - ,2 (n - l ) ,2 ) .  (5 .1 )  
Therefore, from equations (3.2), (3.3) and (5.1), we see that 
>- U, for all i. 
Proposition 5.1.2 For U with (n — 1) tied minimum values with the tied value not 
aM/2(n — 1), 
C/(0 U for at least (n — 1) values of i. 
Proof: A U with (n — 1) tied minimum values with the tied value at l/{2(n — 1)} 
is one of the i7(^)'s. Hence, we only need to proceed for the case of the tied minimum 
value not at l/2(n — 1). Assume that U = {Ui, U2, • • •, Un) is such that U2 = U^ = 
... = Un, with Ui > U2 =U2 = •" = Un- Then it must be that, say, 
U i  =  l - { n - l ) - U n .  (5.2) 
Now, from the fact that a quadratic form, {1 — 2Un • (n — 1) with Un ^ 
l/{2(n — 1)}, always has positive value, we see that 
{ l  - 2 C /n-(n- l ) } 2  =  1 - 4£/„ • (n - 1) + 4[/2 . („ _ i)2 
= 1 - 4C/n • (n - 1){1 - (n - 1) • C/„} > 0. 
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And if we multiply \l2Uni for 0 < (7n < l/n> to above inequality, we get 
1 
2Un 
which reveals that 
1 
2(n — 1){1 — (n — 1) • C/n} > 0 
2Un 
and, in view of (5.2), equation (5.3) can be rewritten as 
>  2 (n - l ){ l - (n - l ) .C /n}, (5.3) 
max J  1  i  J_ \  
1  2(n- l ) . i 7 i '  ' 2 (n - l )  2Un j 
> max| 2(n — 1) • C/j, • • •, 2(n — 1) • 2i7n} , 
Therefore, we can say that 
c / ( " )  U .  
By the same token, we also see that 
yU for i = 2, 3, • • •, n. 
Proposition 5.1.3 For U with k tied minimum values, for 1 < k <n — 2 {k = 1 
denotes unique minimum value), 
{/(O y U for at least k values of i. 
Proof: Assume that U  =  { U i ,  U n )  has tied minima at 
^n_( fc_2)  =  • "  =  Un- And let U* be the largest one among Ui,U2i ifc' 
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then 
{ n - l ) - U n  +  U *  <  E U i  =  I  
i=l 
since U n  = min(t/i, i72, • • •, U n ) -  And the above inequality can be rewritten as 
1 - { n - l ) - U n  >  U * .  (5.4) 
By inserting (5.4) into (5.3) which holds for any U n  with 0 < C/n < l / n ,  we get 
i > 2(n - 1){1 - (n - 1) • Un} > 2(n - 1) • U*. (5.5) 
Hence, from (5.5), we see that 
max / L\ 
\2(n  -  1) .  C / i '  '  2 (n  -  1)  •  '  2 ( / „  J  
> max {2(n - 1). ,..., 2(n - 1) • , 2£/„} 
since, again, i/2'''' > > Un-{k-l) = ^n-{k-2) = = Un. Therefore, 
we can say that 
C / ( " )  U .  
Generally, by the same token, 
C/(0 >- U  for i  — n  —  { k  —  1 ) ,  n — (fc — 2), • • •, n .  
As shown above, propositions 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 imply the external bargaining 
stability of 5 = {£/(!), C/(2),..., ?/(«)}. Indeed, going back over the proof, it is 
clear that 5 is strongly externally bargaining-stable. 
Hence, all told, we conclude that the set S  =  , • • •, C/(")} is strongly 
bargaining-stable. 
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5.2 Case of n > 3, a = 1 and Oj > 0 
In this section, we will briefly consider a non-symmetric bargaining game with, 
say, G of form 
£1 + = 1, (5.6) 
ai 02 an 
with Ui > 0 and > 0. In this case, we are able to find a bargaining-stable set by a 
simple linear transformation of the points. Indeed, a bargaining-stable set S for this 
non-symmetric case will be 5 = { where 
n i l )  .  (  ^  «2 Q3 \ 
'  V 2  '  2 (n - l ) '  2 (n - l ) '  '  '  2 (n  -  1)  /  '  
C;(2) . ( n ^ 03 
\ 2 { n  
an 
l y  2  '  2 (n - l ) '  '  2 (n - l )  
T l i ^ )  •  I  °1 "2 °n-l ^ 
• 2 (n - l ) '  2 (n - l ) '  • "  '  2 (n - l ) '  2  
The proof of S being bargaining-stable will not be given since it follows in 
straight-forward fashion. Figure 5.1 illustrates this linear transformation for the 
case of n = 3. 
5.3 Case of n > 3, a > 0 and oj = 1 
In this section, we will consider n-player bargaining, with G  having form {17 : 
n  
£ C/f = 1, C/f > 0 }, with a > 0, and 5 = { £/(2), • • •, [/(«)} the subset of 
i=l 
G  consisting of the n  payoff n-tuples. 
f / ( l )  :  1 
2V« '  ( 2 (n - l ) ) l / " '  ( 2 (n - l ) ) l / « '  '  (2 (n  - 1 ) ) ! / "  / '  
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U3 
Figure 5.1: A bargaining-stable set for the case of n = 3, a = 1 and >  0  
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^.(2) . ( _i 1_ L ... ^ _ \ 
V (2(n - 1))!/"' 2l/«' (2(n - 1))!/"' ' (2(n - 1))!/" ) ' 
C/(") ; 
(2(n - 1)) V"' (2(n - 1)) V"' ' (2(n - l))l/«' 2l/° ) ' 
The set S  being bargaining-stable is verified as follows: 
Lemma 5.3.1 S = is internally bargaining-stable. 
Proof: For no i and j, , since, clearly, 
C / (O^C/ ( i ) ,  fo r  a l l  i ^ j .  
Lemma 5.3.2 5 = { ?/(")} is externally bargaining-stable. 
Proof; We shall prove Lemma 5.3.2 by means of 3 propositions. 
Proposition 5.3.1 For U with n tied minima, i.e., for U = - • •, 1/n^/ 
for all i. 
Proof: To begin with, a quadratic form (n — 2)^ > 0, or equivalently 
n 2(n — 1) 
2 ^ n " 
The above inequality can be rewritten as 
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which implies 
U^^yU fo r  a l l  i. 
Proposition 5.3.2 For U with (n — 1) tied minima with the tied value not at 
l/{2(n - l)}l/«, 
C/(0 y U for at least (n — 1) values of i. 
Proof: A U  with (n — 1) tied minimum values with the tied value at l/{2(n — 1)}*^ 
is one of the C/(^)'s. Hence, we only need to proceed for the case of the tied minimum 
v a l u e  n o t  a t  l / { 2 ( n  —  1 ) } " .  C o n s i d e r  U  =  { U i ,  -  • •  , U n )  w i t h  U i  >  U 2  =  •  •  •  =  U n -
Then, it must be that, say, 
= (5.7) 
Now, from the fact that a quadratic form, {1 — 21/^ • 1) with ^ 
l/{2(n — 1)}, always has positive value, we see that 
{ l -2 (n - l ) .C /^}2  =  1  -  4(n - l ) .C /«  +  4 (n - l )2 . t / 2a  
=  1  -  4(n - l ) . t / «{ l - (n - l ) .C /^}  >  0 .  
And if we multiply l/(2i7") to above inequality, we get 
^ > 2(n- l ){ l - (n- l ) . t /J} .  (5 .8)  
and, in view of (5.7), equation (5.8) can be rewritten aa 
5^ >2(n- l ) .£Af ,  
41 
or 
^ > {2(n- ! ) } ' /« .  (5.9) 
The left and right hand side of (5.9), respectively, are equivalent as denoting 
f 1 1 1 1 
melX 
^ (2(n - l))l/« .u{ ' (2(n - l))l/« . ' 2l/« • Un 
and 




y U for z = 2, 3, - - v ,  n. 
Proposition 5.3.3 For U with k tied minima, for 1 < k < n — 2 
(A: = 1 denotes unique minimum value), 
C/(0 y If for at least k values of i. 
Proof: Assume that U  =  { U i , U 2 ,  •  •  • ,  U n )  is as (/j, • • •, 
— Un. And if we let 
t/* = max (C^l,t/2,•••,£/„-&), 
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then 
.a " (n - l ) .U°  +  U*  <  =  1  
1=1 
since Un — nniin(f/i, i/2''"' above inequality can be rewritten as 
1 - { n - l ) - U ^ >  t/*". (5.10) 
By inserting (5.10) into (5.8), we get 
^  > 2(n- l ) . { l - (n - l ) -y«}  >  2(n- l ) - t / * ° .  
Hence, from the above inequality, we get 
f 1 
max 
2^1" Uni {2(n - 1)}!/" • £/i' ' {2(n - I)}!/" • £?„_] 
> max|{2(n - l)}'/" • t/j, • • •, {2(n - l)}'/" • y„_i,2l/" • U„] 
or  
/ / ( " )  U - ,  
similarly, 
[/•(O y U ioT i = n — k + 1, •••, n. 
Clearly, Propositions 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 imply the external bargaining-stability 
of 5 = { £/(")}. Also, it is clear that S is strongly externally 
bargaining-stable. 
Hence, we conclude that a set S = { is strongly 
bargaining-stable. 
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5.4 Alternative Approach for the Case of n = 3, a = 1 and = 1 
In this section, we will consider three-player (n = 3) bargaining in an alternative 
3 
way, with the simplex {U : containing the specialization of the 
i=l 
set S of section 5.1 to the case n = 3; 5 = { where 
t/(l) • C i i M 
I  2 '  4 '  4 / '  
t/(2) . fl i 
' V 4' 2' 4 J' 
:  f i ,  i .  i y  
W' 4' 2 / 
The followings are to verify S being bargaining-stable in alternative way. 
That S is internally bargaining-stable follows as in section 5.1. 
The alternative arguement pertains to external bargaining-stability, as follows. 
From the fact that 
(4c - 1)2 = 16c2 _ 8c -1-1 > 0, 
we get, by multiplying 1/8 the above by, 
If we let c, 0 < c < 1/3, be a fixed value of C/3, and consider the lower-left part of 
the triangle shown in Figure 5.2, we get the possible range of C/2 as c < (72 < 
From this, we get the relation, 
1 — 2c 1 — Un — c 
~Tir - lyi ' 
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Figure 5.2: A bargaining-stable set for the case of n = 3, a = 1 and 
which, in view of (5.11), allows us to write 
1/2 ^ I -U2-C  
c 1/4 ' 
or 
f 1/4 1/4 I/2I { l - U o - c  U o  c  1  
" " ' 1 1 / 1  'Tii'lji] 
for 0 < c < 1/3 and c < C/2 — ~ c)/2 • 
The above inequality is equivalent to 
\  Cf i '  t /2  '  1 /3  1  l l /1 ' l /4 ' l /2 j  
or 
which, by symmetry, reveals that S = is externally bargaining-
stable. Also, it is clear that S is strongly externally bargaining-stable. 
Hence, S is strongly bargaining-stable. 
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5.5 Case of a —> oo 
In the general not necessarily symmetric case, the set G is the surface of a 
rectangular parallelotope, and the bargaining-stable set degenerates to a single point, 
namely the appropriate vertex of the parallelotope. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4 
with Figure 5.3 given for purposes of comparison. 
Figure 5.3: A bargaining-stable set for the case of n = 3, a = 2 and = 1 
U3 
Ui 
Figure 5.4: A bargaining-stable set for the case of n = 3, a 00 
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CHAPTER 6. COMPARISONS 
In this chapter, we will compare our bargaining-type solution with three different 
types of solutions drawn from general theory of n-person cooperative games. 
6.1 Von Neumann and Morgenstern Stable Set 
It is perhaps of interest to compare our bargaining-type solution, as phrased in 
terms of bargaining-stable sets S with the classical von Neumann and Morgenstern's 
solution, as phrased in terms of the usual stable sets T. Such a comparison faces the 
conceptual obstacle that a traditional stable set is a set of n-dimensional imputa­
tion vectors. While, in keeping with the traditional two-player bargaining model, a 
bargaining-stable set is a set of n-dimensional "prospect" vectors corresponding to a 
set of obtainable outcomes. Still, for one who interprets an imputation as a prospect, 
a comparison of corresponding solutions may be of some interest. In particular, 
consider the game of section 2.1, for which the set of imputations is the simplex 
I7l -f- C/2 + ^ 3 = Ij >0, and consider as well the situation of section 5.1, for which 
the prospect space also consists of that simplex, and for which our bargaining-stable 
set S consists of the points (1/4,1/4,1/2), (1/4,1/2,1/4) and (1/2,1/4,1/4). 
It is easy to show that our bargaining-stable set S is not a von Neumann and 
Morgenstern stable set; for that purpose, recall the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
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concept of an imputation x dominating an imputation y through a coalition C; for 
the game under consideration 
• a; dominates 7/through {1,2} if (denoted by X ^{12} 
(i) > j/j for all i G {1,2} 
(") Z) ^ t;({l,2}) = l. 
ZG{1,2} 
And, by the same token, 
• X dominates y through {1,2,3} if (denoted byx>-|]^23} 2/) 
(i) XI > j/j for all i G {1,2,3} 
(") Z) ^ ''({1.2,3}) = 1. 
i€{l,2,3} 
• Also, X dominates y li x >-q y for some C. 
From the fact that von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets should have both 
internal and external stability, we see that our bargaining-stable set S is not a von 
Neumann and Morgenstern stable set T, since the set S does not satisfy the external 
stability condition. On the other hand, S does satisfy the internal stability. 
With regard to internal stability, clearly there does not exist C/(^) that dominates 
for any i and j, with respect to the classical definition of domination shown 
above. This reveals that our bargaining-stable set satisfies ordinary internal stability. 
With regaxd to external stability, simply note that (1/3,1/3,1/3) is not domi­
nated by (1/4,1/4,1/2); which can be seen as follows: 
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If we let X = (1/4, 1/4, 1/2) and y = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), then by the classical definition 
of domination, there must exist a coalition C of two or more elements that allows 
XI > yi for all i € C. 
However, we see that the coalition C that satisfies the above requirement is singleton 
{3}, hence, we say, (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is not dominated by (1/4, 1/4, 1/2). 
And of course, by symmetry, neither is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) dominated by (1/4, 1/2, 
1/4) or (1/2, 1/4, 1/4). 
Hence, we conclude that our bargaining-stable set is not an ordinary stable 
set since our bargaining-stable set does not satisfy the ordinary external stability 
condition. 
6.2 Shapley Value 
Shapley [24] looked for an alternative general n-person cooperative solution. 
By adopting three axioms, which are known to be the axiom of effectiveness, the 
axiom of symmetry and the axiom of aggregation, Shapley was able to find a value, a 
solution, for the n-player case, which consist of a single numerical payoff assignment 
to each player: 
<l'i= E fa-')''""''' . [„(Q) _ v(Q - { i ) ) l .  (6 .1 )  
QQN 
ieQ 
Here N stands for the set of all players, n for the number of players in N, and q for 
the number of players in a coalition QQN. Also, the term v{Q) — v{Q — {i}) is the 
marginal amount which player i contributes to the coalition Q, as payoff. 
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Now, consider a three-person symmetric game, for which, 
u ( l )  =  v(2 )  =  t ; (3 )  =  0 ,  
«({1.2}) = u({1,3}) = u({2,3}) = ^ and 
r;({l,2,3}) = l 
where 0 < /3 < 1. Then, the Shapley value for each player will be 
-fl = " W{1,2,3})-i-({2,3})|+ ^ lv({l,2})-.,(2)) 
+ ^ W{1.3})-»(3)1+ W1)-.)W)1 
_ 1 
3' 
Because of symmetry, we also get ^*2 = ^*3 = 5- This solution maintains the sym­
metry of our bargaining-stable set S, and of the classical stable set T, in singleton 
form. 
6.3 Shapley - Harsanyi Value 
Harsanyi [10] expressed Shapley's value in an alternative form: 
( 9 - l ) ! ( n - 5 ) !  
^ w (6.2) 
QCN "• 
i ^ Q  
Conceptually, the terms v ( Q  —  {i}) given by Shapley and the term v { Q )  —  v { N  —  
Q) given by Harsanyi are totally different, however, mathematically, the two terms 
turned out to provide the same result. This will be briefly illustrated as follows: 
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Consider a three-person game with N  =  { i , j ,  fc}, then all possible coalitions that can 
be formed from the set N is {i}, {j}, {k}, {i,j}, {i, fc}, {j,k} and {i,j,k}. Then, 
for each player i, 
QCN 
ieQ 
+ - {i}) 
= u(<^) + u(i) + v(fc) + u({i, fc}) 
=  E  v { N - Q ) .  
QCN 
ieQ 
This is true for any player in a coalition Q, and also true for any arbitrary n-person 
case. 
After redefining Shapley's value in this way, Harsanyi went on to propose the 
following modification, particularly pertinent to bargaining. To begin with, Harsanyi 
g o e s  b a c k  t o  " n o r m a l "  f o r m ,  a n d  p o s i t s  t h r e e  p a y o f f  " m a t r o i d s "  k ) ,  K 2 { i i j i  k )  
and K^^ijjjk), respectively for the three players, as functions of their strategy 
choices. In this format the quantities v(i), v({i,i}) and u({i,j, A:}) appearing in 
(6.2) have the standard maxmin expressions, say. 
u({l,2}) = max min 
0l2 qZ E E + • • u I,J k 
Harsanyi now goes on to replace a term such as u({l,2}) in (6.2) by a term 
v({l,2}) = max min 
0l2 03 
•  W i , ] ,  k )  +  j ,  k )  -  k ) )  •  q  
i , j  k  
.(6.3) 
We illustrate this concept with the zero-sum inessential symmetric game having 
the normal form structure shown in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: A normal form structure for n = 3 
I's st. II'S St. Ill's St. 
^1 Ih 
0 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 1/2 1/2 
1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 1 1/2 0 1/2 
1 1 0 1/2 1/2 0 
1 1 1 1/3 1/3 1/3 
The computations are as follows: 
The coalitions that player I may be involved are {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3} and {1, 2, 3}. At 
first, if we let Q = {1} then N — Q = {2,3}, then from the fact that 
u ( l )  =  max  min  
e\ 023 
E E I') - k) - k)),. e]l 
. ^ 
and also from the normal form structure given above, we get a 2 x 4 matrix for player 
I against player II and III, which can be considered as two-player {Q against N — Q) 
zero-sum game. The matrix for Q, actually for player I in this case, is given as 
^00 ^01 ^10 ^11 
^0 - 1 /3  - 1 -1 -1 
h 1 0 0 -1 /3  
which provides v(l) = -1/3 and t;({2,3}) = 1/3. 
And if we let Q = {1,2}, then from (6.3) and also from the normal form structure 
given above, we get 4x2 matrix for player I and II against player III, such as 
52 
^0 
^00 1/3 - 1 
^01 1 0 
^10 1 0 
^11 1 1/3 
which provides v({l,2}) = 1/3 and u(3) = -1/3. By the same token, we get u(2) = 
-1/3, u({l,3}) = 1/3 and t;({l,2,3}) = 1. 
Hence, the Shapley-Harsanyi value given in (6.2), is 
"1 = ^ W(l,2})-r{3)| 
+  ^  [r({ l , 3} ) - r (2 ) l+  5 ^  Kl ) -K{2 ,3} ) ]  
1 
3" 
This yields (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for Harsanyi's modified Shapley value. 
Of course, for this degenerate symmetric inessential zero-sum situation, our own 
bargaining-stable set also reduces to the degenerate singleton (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). 
For purposes of comparison with our bargaining approach, we have here at least 
two ways to view the prospect space G: 
First, we can view the prospect space as the singleton imputation set (1/3, 1/3, 
1/3), for which we, or for that matter any other reasonable theory of bargaining, 
identify the singleton solution S = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). 
Or, we can view the prospect space as the simplex (a;^ > 0, Sxj = 1) derived 
directly from the normal form of Table 6.1, for which, once again, the bargaining-
stable set S = {(1/2, 1/4, 1/4), (1/4,1/2, 1/4), (1/4, 1/4, 1/2)} of chapter 5 applies. 
CHAPTER 7. ABSTRACT EXTERNAL BARGAINING STABILITY 
We have discussed and compared von Neumann and Morgenstern's ordinary sta­
ble sets and our new bargaining stable sets throughout the previous chapters. From 
those chapters we already recognized that both sets have properties of internal and 
external stability. In this chapter, we focus solely in an abstract pairwise domina­
tion concept, pertinent in particular to von Neumann and Morgenstern domination 
and our own domination concept, but equally descriptive of any anti-symmetric com­
plete not necessarily transitive pairwise domination relation. We then note that, 
with respect to external stability, both von Neumann and Morgenstern and our own 
bargaining-stable sets are in effect complete clcisses with respect to their own partic­
ular domination relations, and ask, in the context of just a few compared "offers", 
how small, at that level of generality, a complete class can be. In particular, we ask 
for the number of compared offers such that a complete class of size two must exist, 
regardless of the nature of the set of pairwise orderings. 
Consider then 5 offer game, which can be expressed as an anti-symmetric 5x5 
matrix with O's and I's, as shown in Table 7.1. In Table 7.1, an offer that has 1 in a 
row is better than an offer which has 1 in that column, for instance, an offer 0\ is 
better than an offer O3 but worse than the offers O2) ^4 05. One can easily 
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Table 7.1: 5-offer game 
^2 03 04 ^5 
- 0 1 0 0 
02 1 - 0 1 1 
^3 0 1 - 1 0 
O4 1 0 0 - 1 
O5 1 0 1 0 -
see that and O2 form a complete cleiss of 2 offers while Oi and O5 do not. 
Generally, for a p offer game, there are p{p — l)/2 number of I's in the anti­
s y mmetric matrix. If we denote the elements of the anti-symmetric matrix A as a^j, 
then we can say offer and i2 form a complete class of 2 offers when the following 
condition is satisfied. 
P 
^ ^^2^ ~ ^^2J ^ ~ P ~ 
i= i  
For up to 6 offer game, there always exist at least one pair of and i2 which 
forms a complete class of 2 offers. However, for 7 or more offers, a complete class of 
2 offers may not exist as shown in Table 7.2. 
It is interesting to note that the domination relations of Table 7.2 actually are 
achievable for our particular bargaining domination, as for example, in the case of 
four players, when the seven offers are eis follows: 
•  Oi :  (  350 ,  375 ,  320 ,  390 )  
• O2: { 360, 345, 330, 390) 
• O3: ( 330, 345, 352, 380) 
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Table 7.2: 7-offer game 
01 02 ^^3 04 ^5 07 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
02 0 - 1 0 0 1 1 
03 1 0 - 0 1 1 0 
04 0 1 1 - 1 0 0 
05 1 1 0 0 - 0 1 
0 0 0 1 1 - 1 
07 1 0 1 1 0 0 -
04; ( 350, 350, 340, 380) 
O5: ( 370, 370, 313, 370) 
Oq: ( 350, 350, 325, 400) 
O7; ( 330, 375, 350, 370) 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
This research proposed one further approach to n-player bargaining, based on 
the classical notion of stable set and the notion of preference intensity, and verified 
its implementability. 
Various kinds of approaches for the two player case were reviewed. 
With the notion of preference intensity, we developed a bargaining-stable set 
which does not "freeze out" any player. Identifying the "prospect space" with the set 
of imputations for a certain three-player game, this accommodating feature is to be 
viewed in the light of a harsher corresponding classical stable set that does "freeze 
out" players. 
For ordinary stable sets, domination between imputations must involve multi-
player coalitions; on the other hand, for bargaining-stable set, dominating always will 
involve single players, that is, for bargaining-stable sets, the coalitions will not be 
effective in determining the outcome of play. 
Finally, the domination relation underlying classical stable sets is not anti­
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